Endogenously Uninformed: Evidence from Comment Letters in China

主讲人

胡宁

讲座时间

2026年6月18日（周四）15:00

讲座地点

25教C402

01 主讲人介绍

胡宁，2019年毕业于上海财经大学，2020年晋升副教授，2023年获长期教职并遴选为博士生导师，2024年晋升教授，主持国家自然科学基金青年项目和面上项目各一项，担任现代审计研究所所长，光华会计拔尖人才，中国会计学会副秘书长，四川省注协人才工作委员会副主任委员，China Journal of Accounting Research青年编委。在人民日报出版社出版专著《选择性监管及其经济后果研究——基于沪深交易所年报问询函的证据》，以第一作者或通讯作者在Journal of Accounting and Public Policy、Journal of Business Finance and Accounting、Accounting Horizons、Energy Economics、Regulation & Governance、Corporate Governance: An International Review和《会计研究》《南开管理评论》等期刊发表论文数篇。

02 讲座内容

We examine how regulatory letters (CLs) affect investors' information acquisition in the Chinese capital marketxai In China, regulators typically address minor issues through private outreach and issue public CLs only when concerns are more serious, making CLs function more as a deterrent sanction than as the routine communication mechanism they represent in the United States. Using investor inquiries on an Investor Interactive Platform (IIP), we find that the disclosure of CLs leads to a significant decline in subsequent investor information acquisition. This reduction persists for up to 24months, leaving CL-related information only partially reflected in prices.

Consistent with a deterrence interpretation, the effect is stronger for more severe CLs and weakens when short-selling constraints are relaxed Additional evidence from institutional site visits and online search activity suggests that the decline in information acquisition extends beyond the IIP channel We further show that this reduction in information acquisition is associated with lower liquidity and weaker price informativeness.

Our findings are consistent with investors rationally allocating scarce attention in portfolio selection, treating regulatory signal sasas screen for redirecting research effort away from probable bad-news firms.